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The Architecture of Europe's Rise and Dissolution

Creation Patterns, Civilizational Complexity, and the Dynamics of Post-Peak Decline

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ABOUT THIS REPORT

Reading Guide and Epistemic Conventions

This is a flagship report in H Heuristics' *Architecture of Creation* programme. It applies the programme's framework of recurring creation patterns to a single, consequential case: the formation, expansion, peak and possible dissolution of European civilization and the wider Western system it helped build. It is written to be read as a continuous argument, but each section is self-contained and begins on a new page.

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Data and code	All charts built from the public datasets cited beneath each figure; simulations are illustrative and described in Appendix A.

How to read the evidence: the epistemic ladder

The report borrows concepts from physics, mathematics and complexity science to illuminate history. Those concepts differ enormously in how much weight they can bear. To keep the distinction visible, every borrowed idea is tagged with one of five status labels, used consistently in text and tables:

Label	Meaning	Example in this report
LAW	A physical law established by repeated experiment within stated conditions. It is not a metaphor.	The second law of thermodynamics; Fick's laws for passive diffusion.
MODEL	A mathematical result that holds under explicit assumptions. Valid as mathematics; applicability to societies is a separate question.	Fisher-Kolmogorov wave fronts; preferential-attachment networks; critical slowing down.
EMPIRICAL	A measured regularity in historical, demographic or economic data, with stated uncertainty.	Urban scaling exponents; the fertility record; ancient-DNA admixture.
ANALOGY	A structural resemblance used as a heuristic. No quantitative prediction is transferred.	Entropy as a metaphor for institutional fragmentation.
HYPOTHESIS	An H Heuristics interpretive claim, offered for testing and explicitly falsifiable.	The 'absorption ratio' hypothesis (Section 7); the late-K / early-Ω placement (Section 10).

NOTICE

This report is research and analysis. It is not a forecast, and it is not investment, legal or political advice. Scenario judgements in Section 10 are qualitative and reflect H Heuristics' analytical view at the date of publication. In-text citations and reference entries are hyperlinked to primary sources where available (DOIs, publisher pages, official statistical releases); where a publisher page was not reliably available, the link leads to a library catalogue record.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Argument in Brief

This report asks a deliberately symmetrical question: can the architecture that enables a civilization to emerge, expand and achieve dominance also explain how it loses coherence, fragments and gives way to new configurations? For Europe, our answer is a qualified yes. The six recurring patterns that govern how organized structures form in nature—emergence from constraints, flows and diffusion, scaling, convergence, feedback, and entropy-bound maintenance—are not one-way streets. Each pattern that powered Europe's ascent has a mirror image that operates during saturation and dissolution.

DEFINING PROPOSITION

Civilizations are not permanent structures. They are continuously reproduced configurations of matter, energy, information, institutions, and human relationships. Their rise depends on the conditions that allow their architecture to scale; their decline begins when those conditions can no longer sustain the architecture in its existing form.

Seven findings

1. **Europe's rise was a configuration, not a destiny.** A peninsular geography with no single core, a polycentric political landscape on a shared cultural substrate, dense city and trade networks, and reinforcing loops linking commerce, state capacity, science and—after 1800—fossil energy produced an unusual mix of competition and diffusion (Sections 3–5).
2. **The same architecture carries its own dissolution dynamics.** Complexity has to be maintained; beyond a threshold its marginal returns fall ([Tainter 1988](#)). Network hubs that enable integration become single points of failure ([Albert, Jeong & Barabási 2000](#)). Loops that built power can reverse into loops of strain (Sections 2, 6, 8).
3. **The conditions that sustained the peak are changing together.** The West's share of world output (PPP) fell from roughly 58% in 1913 to about 30% in 2022 ([Bolt & van Zanden 2024](#), panel coverage caveats in Appendix A). The EU's share of world nominal GDP fell from 29% in 1980 to 17.5% in 2024 and its population share to 5.5% ([World Bank](#)). Much of this is the signature of successful diffusion rather than European failure, but the supports of the peak—technological lead, cheap energy, demographic expansion, outsourced security—are eroding simultaneously (Section 6).
4. **Demography is the largest and least ambiguous structural driver.** The EU fertility rate hit a record-low 1.34 in 2024 ([Eunews 2026](#)); natural change has been negative since 2012 ([Eurostat 2026a](#)). Eurostat's baseline projection has the EU population falling to about 420 million by 2100, to about 295 million in a no-migration counterfactual, while old-age dependency climbs from 33 to roughly 60 per hundred ([Eurostat 2023a](#); [Eurostat 2023b](#)) (Section 7).
5. **Ethnic blending and cultural change are constitutive of Europe, and are not automatic causes of collapse.** Ancient DNA documents repeated large-scale admixture ([Lazaridis et al. 2014](#); [Haak et al. 2015](#)). The empirical literature finds small, context-dependent associations between diversity and social trust ([Dinesen, Schaeffer & Sønderskov 2020](#)) and neutral-to-positive fiscal and productivity effects under favourable conditions ([Dustmann & Frattini 2014](#); [Alesina, Harnoss & Rapoport 2016](#)).

The risk lies in the ratio of change to institutional absorption capacity, interacting with economic insecurity and political fragmentation (Section 7).

- 6. **The present stress is coupled.** Euro-area public debt near 89% of GDP, a defence build-up toward 3.5% + 1.5% of GDP ([NATO 2025](#)), energy import dependency of 57% ([Eurostat 2026e](#)), accelerating climate risk and strained party systems interact as a polycrisis ([Lawrence et al. 2024](#)). Collapse in Tainter’s sense—rapid loss of sociopolitical complexity—is not indicated by current evidence. Relative decline with institutional strain is the modal path, with a non-trivial tail risk of cascading dissolution in the fiscal and political layers (Sections 8–10).
- 7. **Reorganization is the real question.** We set out four scenarios—Renewal, Sclerotic Persistence, Reorganization by Design and Disorderly Dissolution—and a set of falsifiable signposts for telling them apart (Section 10).

Europe at a glance

1.34 EU total fertility rate, 2024: record low; replacement is about 2.1	58% → 30% The West's share of world GDP (PPP), 1913 → 2022	57% EU energy import dependency, 2024	≈ 89% Euro-area government debt, % of GDP, mid-2026
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WHAT THIS REPORT DOES NOT CLAIM

- That European collapse is inevitable, imminent, or predictable by any known law.
- That migration, cultural diversity or demographic change *cause* civilizational decline. The evidence reviewed in Section 7 does not support that claim, and the Roman case (Section 9) cautions against it.
- That physical laws dictate social outcomes. Thermodynamics, diffusion and network theory set constraints and supply analogies; history is made by institutions and choices.

SECTION 1

The Question and the Framework

Histories of Europe usually separate its ascent from its anxieties: the first is told as a story of institutions, ideas and industry; the second as a story of contingent crises. This report treats them as two phases of one analytical problem. If the emergence and persistence of organized structures throughout nature follow recurring patterns, then the rise and the possible dissolution of a civilization should be legible in the same vocabulary.

1.1 The central thesis

Matter and energy organize under physical constraints. Interactions generate recurring structures. Networks enable flows. Feedback reinforces or destabilizes existing arrangements. Diffusion spreads successful configurations, while competition and environmental pressure select among them. Structures persist when their sustaining conditions remain viable, and they transform or dissolve when those conditions deteriorate. Europe’s evolution—from tribal societies through empires, medieval kingdoms, industrial nation-states and the modern Western system—can be examined through these recurring patterns.

Europe’s potential post-peak transition therefore raises an inverse question: **can the same architecture that enables a civilization to emerge, expand and achieve dominance also explain how it loses coherence, fragments, and eventually gives way to new configurations?** We take the question seriously enough to give it a disciplined answer, which requires distinguishing what physics and mathematics actually establish from what social science can responsibly borrow.

1.2 Six creation patterns applied to Europe

H Heuristics’ *Architecture of Creation* identifies six patterns that recur from the formation of galaxies to the formation of cities. Table 1 states each pattern and its European application; Section 2 sets out their physical and mathematical foundations and the limits of each.

Table 1. The six creation patterns and their European application

Pattern	Core idea	European application
1. Emergence from constraints	Physical laws constrain the possible forms matter can assume. Similarly, geography, climate, resources and technology constrain the political and economic structures societies can sustain.	How geography, agricultural conditions, coastlines and resource access shaped settlements, trade networks and political organization.
2. Flows and diffusion	Matter, energy and information move through gradients and connected systems. Fick’s law describes one form of diffusion; social diffusion needs models of networks, incentives and institutions.	The spread of technologies, ideas, religions, languages, administrative systems and industrial capabilities across populations and borders.
3. Emergence and scaling	Interactions between smaller components generate higher-order structures with capabilities unavailable to the parts.	How local communities became cities, kingdoms, states, empires and supranational institutions through coordination and specialization.
4. Recurring patterns and convergence	Different systems can develop similar structures when they face comparable constraints, whatever their origins.	The recurring emergence of bureaucracies, urban centres, taxation, armies and commercial institutions—and Europe’s changing position as other regions develop comparable or superior capabilities.

Pattern	Core idea	European application
5. Reinforcement, feedback and instability	Positive feedback accelerates growth; negative feedback stabilizes; feedback can also amplify failure once reinforcing mechanisms turn destabilizing.	How industrialization, trade, science and institutional capacity reinforced European power—and how debt, geopolitical competition, demographic pressure and fragmentation might interact in the opposite direction.
6. Entropy, maintenance and dissolution	Organized structures need sustaining conditions. Thermodynamic entropy has a precise meaning; institutional fragmentation and loss of coordination are analogous, not identical.	Whether inherited institutions, shared identities, economic arrangements and geopolitical advantages can reproduce themselves under changing conditions—or fragment and reorganize.

1.3 Creation and dissolution as one question

Read as a cycle, the six patterns map onto six phases through which a structure passes. Each phase is *dominated by*, though never exclusively governed by, one or two patterns (Figure 1). The framework matters analytically because it forces the same questions to be asked of the same structure at different moments:




Figure 1. The Architecture of Creation as a cycle. Formation through reorganization, with the creation patterns that dominate each phase. Reorganization returns to Pattern 1: the surviving components face new constraints and new emergence begins.

Source: H Heuristics framework.

- **Formation:** what constraints and interactions make a new structure possible?
- **Expansion:** what allows that structure to capture resources, scale and spread?
- **Dominance:** which feedback mechanisms reinforce its position?
- **Saturation:** what happens when the conditions that supported expansion change?
- **Dissolution:** which connections, institutions and identities become less capable of maintaining the whole?

- **Reorganization:** what new structures emerge from the remaining components?

This framework connects the *Architecture of Creation* to the *Architecture of Collapse*: the patterns that explain how organized systems emerge also help to explain their vulnerabilities and transformation. For Europe, the report's empirical task is to establish where on this cycle the continent and its institutions now sit, and which mechanisms are doing the work.

1.4 Defining proposition

Civilizations are not permanent structures. They are continuously reproduced configurations of matter, energy, information, institutions, and human relationships. Their rise depends on the conditions that allow their architecture to scale; their decline begins when those conditions can no longer sustain the architecture in its existing form.

That makes Europe a case study within H Heuristics' broader theory of recurring creation patterns: from the formation of structures in nature to the rise, peak, fragmentation and reorganization of human civilization. The proposition has two important implications. First, decline is located in the *conditions*, not in the people: the question is never whether a population has lost some vital essence but whether the energy, institutions, information flows and relationships that reproduce the structure remain viable. Second, 'continuously reproduced' implies that every civilization is always one failure of reproduction away from transformation, so maintenance—not just invention—is a first-order activity.

1.5 Terms, scope and method

FOUR TERMS USED THROUGHOUT

- **Decline** is relative loss: of share, power, or rank. It is compatible with growth in absolute terms.
- **Dissolution** is loss of connectivity or coordinating capacity among the components of a structure, which may be partial (one institutional layer) or general.
- **Collapse** is a rapid and substantial loss of established sociopolitical complexity ([Tainter 1988](#)). Specialists contest how often the term is warranted ([Middleton 2017](#); [Butzer 2012](#)), and we use it only in that strict sense.
- **Reorganization** is the emergence of new configurations from surviving components. It is the normal outcome of dissolution; extinction is not.

Scope. 'Europe' refers to the geographic and historical continent and to its principal institutional expressions, notably the European Union, and to the wider Western system of which it is the core. Where data permit we use EU-27 aggregates; where history requires, we speak of Europe as a whole. **Method.** The report synthesizes peer-reviewed literature in physics, complexity science, economic history, genetics, demography and political economy; analyses public datasets from Eurostat, the World Bank and the Maddison Project; and uses three small simulations to illustrate formal results. **Limits.** Historical analogy is not prediction. Europe is not a closed system, the sample of comparable civilizations is small, and the quantities that matter most—institutional capacity, trust, legitimacy—are the hardest to measure.

SECTION 2

Foundations: Physical Laws and Mathematical Patterns

Before applying the framework to Europe, we need to say precisely what each pattern asserts in the sciences where it originates, how much of it survives translation to societies, and where it misleads. This section walks through the six patterns in order. The labels introduced in the reading guide (**LAW**, **MODEL**, **EMPIRICAL**, **ANALOGY**, **HYPOTHESIS**) mark the epistemic status of each claim.

2.1 Emergence from constraints

Physical laws do not prescribe a single outcome; they delimit a space of possible ones. Conservation laws, boundary conditions and the available energy determine which configurations of matter can exist, and within that space the interactions of components generate structures—crystals, convection cells, organisms—whose properties are not simply deducible from the parts. [Anderson \(1972\)](#) summarized the point as “more is different”: at each level of organization new regularities appear that cannot be read off the level below. **LAW** for the constraints themselves; **ANALOGY** when the idea is carried over to societies.

In human systems the analogous constraints are geography, climate, soils, energy sources, technology and demography. They are *boundary conditions*, not determinants: they make some political forms cheap and others unsustainable, yet the same Mediterranean coastline supported both dozens of competing city-states and a single empire. Section 3 applies this pattern to Europe's formation.

2.2 Flows and diffusion

Matter, energy and information move along gradients. For passive diffusion, [Fick \(1855\)](#) established that the flux is proportional to the concentration gradient, $J = -D \partial C / \partial x$, and that concentration evolves according to $\partial C / \partial t = D \partial^2 C / \partial x^2$. Two consequences matter for our purposes. Net movement runs down gradients, not up them; and the distance spanned by pure diffusion grows with the *square root* of time, so reach is slow and costly at long range. **LAW** for passive transport in dilute media.

Add local growth to diffusion and the dynamics change qualitatively. In the reaction–diffusion equation analysed by [Fisher \(1937\)](#), an advantageous variant spreads as a travelling front with constant speed $c = 2\sqrt{rD}$, where r is the local growth rate. **MODEL** This is one of the few places where a formal diffusion model has been tested against European data: [Ammerman & Cavalli-Sforza \(1971\)](#) showed that the radiocarbon record of the spread of Neolithic farming across Europe is consistent with a wave of advance at roughly one kilometre per year, an estimate subsequent work has refined but not overturned (**EMPIRICAL**; see also [Ammerman & Cavalli-Sforza 1984](#)). Figure 2 illustrates both regimes.




Figure 2. Two diffusion regimes. (a) Fickian spreading from a fixed source: the profile broadens as $\sqrt{t}$. (b) Fisher–Kolmogorov reaction–diffusion: a front of constant shape advances at constant speed. Simulations by H Heuristics (parameters in Appendix A).

Source: Numerical solution of the diffusion and Fisher–KPP equations; after [Fick 1855](#) and [Fisher 1937](#).

Social diffusion is not Fickian. Ideas, technologies and institutions travel through networks with long-range ties that let them jump gradients ([Watts & Strogatz 1998](#)), and their adoption depends on incentives, costs and institutions: [Comin & Hobijn \(2010\)](#) find adoption lags of decades that differ by country and technology. **ANALOGY** Fick’s law supplies a null model—what spread would look like if only proximity mattered—against which networks, trade routes, religions and states can be seen as *channels* that raise or lower effective diffusivity.

2.3 Emergence and scaling

Higher-order structures arise when components interact in a way that lets the whole do what no part can. Many such structures are self-similar across scales—fractal in [Mandelbrot \(1982\)](#)’s sense—and many networks are scale-free: when new nodes attach preferentially to well-connected ones, a few hubs accumulate most links ([Barabási & Albert 1999](#)). **MODEL** Figure 5 in Section 4 shows such a network, and Figure 3 summarizes self-similarity and scaling. Urban systems provide a rare quantitative bridge to societies. Across many city systems, socioeconomic outputs such as wages, patents and GDP scale *superlinearly* with population (exponent ≈ 1.15), while infrastructure scales *sublinearly* (≈ 0.85) ([Bettencourt et al. 2007](#); [West 2017](#)). **EMPIRICAL**

The corollary, derived in the same work, is the one that matters for civilizations: sustained superlinear growth implies a finite-time singularity unless the system periodically resets through innovations that open new niches, and the interval between resets must shrink. **MODEL** A society whose rate of fundamental innovation slows while its coordination costs grow is therefore exposed on both sides. We return to this in Section 6.




Figure 3. Self-similarity and scaling. (a) A self-similar hierarchy: coordination units nest from household to union. (b) Stylised urban scaling relations: outputs rise faster than population; infrastructure rises slower. Exponents approximate those reported by [Bettencourt et al. 2007](#).

Source: Stylised illustration by H Heuristics.

2.4 Recurring patterns and convergence

Systems under comparable constraints tend to converge on comparable forms. In physics, very different materials share the same critical exponents near phase transitions; in biology, eyes and wings evolved repeatedly. **MODEL**, **EMPIRICAL** In human history, the Seshat databank ([Seshat 2026](#)) shows that dozens of measures of social complexity—population, territory, hierarchy, information systems, infrastructure—collapse onto one dominant dimension ([Turchin et al. 2018](#)), and that military competition helps drive the scaling of states ([Turchin et al. 2013](#)). Economies with similar productive capabilities diversify along similar paths ([Hidalgo & Hausmann 2009](#)). **EMPIRICAL**

Convergence has a double edge for the originator. Institutional forms that Europe pioneered—the bureaucratic state, the joint-stock company, the research university—are not intrinsically European; once learned or imposed they reappear wherever similar constraints bind, and a former leader's comparative advantage erodes. Section 6 shows this empirically.

2.5 Reinforcement, feedback and instability

Positive feedback amplifies deviations and accelerates growth; negative feedback damps them. Systems in which stabilizing feedback weakens can cross a tipping point and shift abruptly to a different regime, often with hysteresis, so that reversing the stress does not reverse the change ([Scheffer et al. 2009](#); [Scheffer et al. 2012](#)). **MODEL** Near such thresholds recovery from perturbation slows—‘critical slowing down’—and variance and autocorrelation rise, which has been proposed as an early-warning signature. Its empirical reliability is established for some ecological and climate systems and is *unproven* for societies; Section 10 uses it as a monitoring concept, not a forecast.

Three further results bear on civilizations. Self-organized criticality shows that driven systems can tune themselves to states in which small perturbations occasionally trigger avalanches of any size ([Bak, Tang & Wiesenfeld 1987](#)). **MODEL** Scale-free networks are robust to random failure but fragile to the targeted loss of hubs ([Albert, Jeong & Barabási 2000](#))—a result we reproduce in Section 4 (Figure 5). And when networks are *interdependent*, failures in one can propagate to another so that coupling itself produces catastrophic

cascades (Buldyrev et al. 2010); banking and global-risk systems have been analysed in these terms (Haldane & May 2011; May, Levin & Sugihara 2008; Helbing 2013). **MODEL**

2.6 Entropy, maintenance and dissolution

The second law of thermodynamics states that the entropy of an isolated system never decreases. **LAW** Ordered structures nonetheless persist in *open* systems far from equilibrium—organisms, storms, flames, cities—by importing low-entropy energy and exporting entropy to their surroundings (Schrödinger 1944; Prigogine & Stengers 1984). Three consequences follow. First, order is not free: it is maintained by continuous throughput. Second, because Earth receives a large solar flux, the second law does *not* imply that civilizations must decay on any timescale; the binding constraints are on rates, stocks and sinks (for example the pace at which fossil stocks are drawn down or waste heat and carbon are absorbed). Third, ‘entropy’ in the Boltzmann–Clausius sense, Shannon’s information entropy and the loose idea of ‘social entropy’ are different quantities.

Georgescu-Roegen (1971) argued that the material economy irreversibly degrades low-entropy resources into high-entropy waste. The argument is a legitimate thermodynamic constraint on material throughput (**LAW** - grounded). Applied to institutions it becomes an **ANALOGY**: fragmentation of authority, erosion of trust or loss of coordination resemble entropic disordering in that they require continuous work to hold at bay, but they are not measured in joules per kelvin and cannot be derived from the second law. We use the term in that disciplined, analogical sense, and we pair it with an empirically grounded concept of maintenance cost taken from the study of complex societies (Section 6).

WHAT PHYSICS DOES AND DOES NOT TELL US

- It supplies **constraints**: energy throughput is required to maintain order; diffusion is slow at long range; hub-dominated networks are fragile at the hubs.
- It supplies **models** whose structure can be tested against historical data (wave fronts, cascades, tipping points).
- It does **not** supply a timetable for decline, a verdict on any culture or population, or a derivation of social outcomes. Where the report uses a physical term for a social process, the label **ANALOGY** marks the boundary.

Table 2. From physical statement to social use: what transfers and what does not

Concept	Formal statement	Status	Legitimate use here	Misuse to avoid
Fick's laws	$J = -D \partial C / \partial x; \partial C / \partial t = D \partial^2 C / \partial x^2$	LAW (passive transport)	Null model for spread when only proximity matters	Treating agents and institutions as molecules
Fisher–KPP front	Constant speed $c = 2\sqrt{(rD)}$	MODEL	Neolithic spread; calibrating diffusion rates	Predicting adoption of any social practice
Preferential attachment	Power-law degree distribution	MODEL	Hubs in trade, finance, energy and governance networks	Assuming every social network is scale-free
Urban scaling	Output $\propto N^{1.15}$; infrastructure $\propto N^{0.85}$	EMPIRICAL	Why scale raises innovation and coordination cost together	Extrapolating exponents beyond observed ranges
Critical slowing down	Rising variance and autocorrelation near a tipping point	MODEL	Monitoring concept (Section 10)	Treating it as a reliable predictor in societies
Second law	Entropy of an isolated system never decreases	LAW	Order requires throughput; stocks and sinks bind	Claiming it dictates civilizational decline

SECTION 3

Formation: Emergence from Constraints

A civilization begins as a solution to a set of constraints. Pattern 1 asks which constraints made European forms of organization possible, and which interactions turned scattered settlements into a connected system. Figure 4 sets out the phases of European history that Sections 3 to 8 follow, with the dominant pattern in each.

Tribal and Neolithic c. 7000–800 BCE Farming wave; steppe and Bronze Age admixture; chiefdoms <i>Diffusion of farming</i>	Classical city-states and Rome 800 BCE–476 CE Poleis → territorial empire; roads, law, coinage, legions <i>Scaling, then strain</i>	Post-Roman kingdoms 476–1000 Simplification; Church as connective tissue; manorial economy <i>Reorganization</i>	High and late medieval 1000–1500 Towns, universities, guilds; Black Death; competing monarchies <i>Network densification</i>
Early modern state system 1500–1800 Printing, Reformation, military revolution; Atlantic commerce <i>Competition + diffusion</i>	Industrial nation-states 1800–1914 Coal, rail, factories; empire and mass nationalism <i>Positive feedback</i>	Catastrophe and integration 1914–1991 World wars; welfare states; Cold War; European Communities <i>Shock, then re-coupling</i>	Union and polycrisis 1991–today EU/euro; enlargement; debt, migration, war, climate, AI <i>Maintenance under stress</i>

Figure 4. Eight phases of European history read through the creation patterns. Each phase is characterized by the structure's scale of coordination and by the pattern that dominates it. Phase boundaries are conventional and overlapping.

Source: H Heuristics synthesis.

3.1 Geography as boundary condition

Europe is a western peninsula of Eurasia with an unusually long, indented coastline, many navigable rivers, rain-fed agriculture across temperate plains, and mountain ranges and seas that carve the continent into defensible regions. Unlike the Nile, the Yellow River or Mesopotamia, it contains no single irrigated core that a conqueror could capture to command the rest. [Scheidel \(2019\)](#) argues that this is why, after Rome, no empire ever reunified the continent: the default outcome of European geography was durable political *polycentrism*, in which many states of comparable strength competed and imitated one another.

Geography is permissive, not determinative. The Mediterranean coast unified Rome and fragmented Greece; the same coal seams that powered Britain lay unused for centuries. Constraints shaped the *cost* of different

political forms, and costs interacted with institutions, technology and chance. The point of Pattern 1 is that Europe's structure was not designed but *selected* within a bounded space.

3.2 The first fact of European history: blending

The Neolithic transition reached Europe from Anatolia between roughly 9,000 and 6,000 years ago, advancing at an average pace of about a kilometre a year ([Ammerman & Cavalli-Sforza 1971](#); [Ammerman & Cavalli-Sforza 1984](#)). Ancient-genome studies show that this was not just the spread of a technology: farmers from the Near East largely *replaced and mixed with* local hunter-gatherer populations. Present-day Europeans descend from at least three deep ancestral sources—western hunter-gatherers, early European farmers, and a population related to ancient north Eurasians ([Lazaridis et al. 2014](#)). Around 5,000 years ago, pastoralists from the Pontic–Caspian steppe moved west in a migration large enough to account for a substantial share—by some estimates a majority—of the ancestry of Corded Ware–associated individuals in central Europe ([Haak et al. 2015](#); [Allentoft et al. 2015](#)). **EMPIRICAL**

This matters for the argument that follows. Any claim about the 'continuity' of European populations has to begin from the finding that European ancestry is itself the product of repeated large-scale admixture, a pattern that continues through Celts, Romans, Germanic peoples, Slavs, Magyars, Vikings, Normans and later arrivals. 'Blending' is not a deviation from European history; it is one of its formative mechanisms. What varied, and what matters for stability, was whether successive blends were absorbed by institutions capable of integrating them.

3.3 From chiefdoms to city-states to empire

Bronze Age Europe developed hierarchies, long-distance trade in tin and copper, and palatial centres. The Aegean palaces and the wider Eastern Mediterranean network failed together around 1200 BCE, a systemic collapse we examine in Section 9. The classical city-states that followed demonstrated Pattern 2 at small scale: the Greek poleis competed, copied and traded intensively, producing rapid innovation in politics and philosophy but limited capacity to scale.

Rome solved the scaling problem with a toolkit: roads and sea lanes, a common law and currency, a professional army paid by taxation, and a flexible citizenship that eventually extended, in 212 CE, to nearly all free inhabitants. Ancient DNA from the city of Rome shows the result: imperial-era Romans carried ancestry from across the Mediterranean and the Near East, so that the imperial capital was, genetically as well as culturally, a crossroads ([Antonio et al. 2019](#)). **EMPIRICAL** Rome's success in *absorbing* newcomers was a source of strength for centuries.

Rome also reveals the physical constraint on this form of organization. Pre-industrial economies ran on solar energy captured by crops, forests and muscle, which capped surplus per head ([Smil 2017](#)). Large armies, a fiscal bureaucracy and city provisioning had to be financed from agricultural output; when returns to expansion fell, upkeep consumed the surplus. That is the logic examined in Section 6 and tested against the historical record in Section 9.

3.4 Reorganization after Rome

The Western Roman Empire ceased to exist as a political entity in 476 CE, but its dissolution was a long process whose character is still debated. [Ward-Perkins \(2005\)](#) documents a steep, material simplification in the post-Roman West—fewer and cruder pottery and building, shrinking trade, falling literacy—and argues that 'civilization' did end for the people who lived through it; [Wickham \(2005\)](#) emphasizes continuities and

gradual transformation in landholding, law and elite culture. Both findings are compatible with a general lesson about the dissolution of complex structures: the *scale* of coordination falls sharply, while components—language, law, religion, farming, urban sites—survive and are recombined.

What emerged was a patchwork of successor kingdoms, manorial estates and ecclesiastical networks. The Latin Church became the connective tissue of the West, and its marriage and family regulations, by weakening extended-kin institutions, appear to have shifted psychology and social organization toward impersonal trust, a mechanism that later underpinned cities, markets and states ([Schulz et al. 2019](#); [Henrich 2020](#)). **EMPIRICAL** **HYPOTHESIS** The post-Roman reorganization thus contained the seeds of the next phase of emergence, which is how the cycle in Figure 1 closes: new constraints, surviving components, new structures.

SECTION FINDING

Europe's formation combined four ingredients: a **permissive but partitioned geography**; **repeated demographic blending**; **competition among many centres** rather than a single hegemon; and, after Rome, a **pan-European connective institution** (the Church) that preserved a shared substrate. These are the conditions that the next two phases amplified—and the ones whose maintenance later sections examine.

SECTION 4

Expansion: Flows, Diffusion and Scaling

From roughly 1000 CE a structure that had been reorganized at low scale began to grow. Patterns 2 and 3 dominate this phase: information, goods, pathogens and people flowed along dense networks, and local communities coordinated into cities, kingdoms and states. Three engines were at work—network densification, competition among many centres, and institutional scaling—and each left a trace in recent quantitative history.

4.1 Network densification

Medieval Europe thickened its connections. Monasteries, dioceses and a common Latin learned culture formed a continent-wide network; towns and guilds multiplied; trading leagues such as the Hanse linked the North and Baltic seas; and from the twelfth century universities appeared. [Cantoni & Yuchtman \(2014\)](#) show that the founding of universities in the Holy Roman Empire—triggered by the Great Western Schism—was followed by an expansion of trained legal specialists and of formal legal institutions, and by greater commercial activity: a clear case of an institutional innovation diffusing through a network and changing economic behaviour. **EMPIRICAL**

Connectedness also carried a cost. The Black Death of 1347–1351, which killed perhaps a third to a half of Europeans, travelled along the same trade routes that enriched the continent; genomic work shows that the plague bacterium then circulated and re-emerged for centuries ([Spyrou et al. 2019](#)). The demographic shock raised real wages and shifted bargaining power from landlords to labourers ([Allen 2001](#)). [Voigtländer & Voth \(2013\)](#) argue that the combination of recurrent war, plague and urbanization raised European incomes per head by holding population below its Malthusian limit. **EMPIRICAL** The point for our framework is structural: the same channel that diffuses innovation diffuses shocks.

4.2 Fragmentation as an engine of selection

A defining feature of the expansion was that Europe did not unify. On [Tilly \(1990\)](#)'s estimate, the roughly five hundred more-or-less independent political units of 1500 had consolidated to about twenty-five by 1900, a figure that tells of relentless warfare and of selection for states able to raise taxes and armies. A literature on the fiscal-military state shows that conflict raised state capacity ([Gennaioli & Voth 2015](#)), promoted urban growth ([Dincecco & Onorato 2016](#)), and rewarded early investment in gunpowder, fortification and finance ([Hoffman 2015](#)). **EMPIRICAL** Competition operated in ideas as well as in arms. Where the printing press arrived early, cities grew markedly faster in the following century—by roughly 60 percentage points between 1500 and 1600 in one estimate ([Dittmar 2011](#))—and religious rivalry after the Reformation spurred both literacy ([Becker & Woessmann 2009](#)) and reallocations of resources toward new ideas and institutions ([Cantoni, Dittmar & Yuchtman 2018](#)).

[Mokyr \(2016\)](#) describes the result as a 'market for ideas': because a persecuted thinker could cross a border, no single authority could suppress an innovation for long, and a shared scholarly culture—the Republic of Letters—let the best ideas diffuse across political boundaries. [Johnson & Koyama \(2017\)](#) add that states with *both* capacity and constraints were the ones that sustained growth. **HYPOTHESIS** H Heuristics' reading: Europe combined the *diffusion benefits of a single cultural area* with the *selection pressure of many competing*

polities. That combination is the architectural signature of the expansion, and as Section 8 argues, it is a configuration that integration both builds on and puts at risk.

Table 3. Diffusion events that shaped European expansion

Event	Channel	Pace and reach	Principal effect	Evidence
Neolithic farming	Migration and admixture along rivers and coasts	About 1 km per year across the continent	Replacement of foraging economies; new populations	Ammerman & Cavalli-Sforza 1971 ; Lazaridis et al. 2014
University network	Church, princes, mobile scholars	Centuries; Holy Roman Empire from 1386	Legal professionals; commercial institutions	Cantoni & Yuchtman 2014
Black Death	Maritime and overland trade routes	Continent-wide in 1347–1351; recurrent	Mortality of one-third to one-half; higher real wages	Spyrou et al. 2019 ; Allen 2001
Printing press	Merchant and university towns	Dozens of cities by 1500	Faster urban growth; religious and scientific dissemination	Dittmar 2011
Reformation	Print and competing princes	Sixteenth century	Literacy gains; secularization of resources	Becker & Woessmann 2009 ; Cantoni, Dittmar & Yuchtman 2018
Atlantic commerce	Ships, chartered companies, slavery	Sixteenth to eighteenth centuries	Merchant power and checks on executives; coerced extraction	Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2005 ; Pomeranz 2000

4.3 Scaling beyond the continent


Expansion crossed the oceans. [Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson \(2005\)](#) find that Atlantic trade raised growth in European countries that already had non-absolutist institutions, because it empowered commercial interests able to constrain the crown; Britain and the Netherlands gained most. The same expansion rested on coercion, conquest and the Atlantic slave trade. [Pomeranz \(2000\)](#) argues that New World land and resources relieved Europe's land constraint—'ghost acreage'—and thereby helped it avoid the ecological ceiling that bound other advanced regions. In the language of Pattern 2, European institutions learned to capture flows down global gradients of resources, labour and silver. Whatever the moral assessment, the structural consequence is that part of Europe's peak was sustained by advantages that were never intrinsic to the continent, and which would later erode (Section 6).

4.4 Hubs, robustness and fragility

As European networks grew they acquired the structure that preferential-attachment models predict: a few hubs—Venice, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London—handled a disproportionate share of trade and finance, and hub succession followed shifts in routes and institutions. Scale-free networks have a characteristic robustness profile ([Albert, Jeong & Barabási 2000](#)): they withstand the random loss of nodes remarkably well but disintegrate when the best-connected nodes are removed. **MODEL** Figure 5 reproduces this in a simulated network of 1,500 nodes.

European history offers its own examples of hub dependence: medieval city-state finance, the Atlantic ports, the Baltic grain trade. The implication is general. Efficient integration concentrates traffic in a few nodes, and the loss, capture or coercion of those nodes—capital cities, financial centres, ports, pipelines, interconnectors, supranational institutions—has system-wide consequences. Section 8 applies this to the contemporary European system.

(a) Preferential attachment yields hubs



(b) Robust to noise, fragile to hub loss




Figure 5. Hubs and fragility. (a) A scale-free network formed by preferential attachment; the highest-degree nodes are shown in amber. (b) Removing nodes at random leaves most of the network connected, while removing the best-connected nodes first fragments it. Averages over three simulated networks of 1,500 nodes.

Source: H Heuristics simulation after [Barabási & Albert 1999](#) and [Albert, Jeong & Barabási 2000](#).

SECTION FINDING

Expansion was powered by flows along densifying networks and by competition among many polities within a common cultural area. It was also sustained by external gradients—colonial extraction, new land and cheap resources—and by hub structures that are efficient in good times and fragile when hubs fail.

SECTION 5

Dominance: Feedback and Industrial Power

Dominance is the phase in which reinforcing feedback does most of the work. Once a structure has captured enough resources, its own growth generates the means for more growth. For Europe, the period from about 1750 to 1914 is the clearest example, and the quantitative record shows how large the effect was.

5.1 Rival explanations as parts of one loop

Why Europe, and why then? The literature offers several answers. [Pomeranz \(2000\)](#) stresses the contingent proximity of British coal and the access to New World resources that relaxed land constraints. [Allen \(2009\)](#) argues that high wages and cheap energy made labour-saving, energy-using machines profitable in Britain and nowhere else. [Wrigley \(2010\)](#) describes the transition from an organic economy, bound to the annual flow of solar energy through land, to a mineral-energy economy that drew on stocks of coal. [Mokyr \(2016\)](#) emphasizes a culture of growth born of the Republic of Letters and Enlightenment, and [Acemoglu & Robinson 2012](#) stress inclusive institutions that rewarded investment and constrained rulers. **EMPIRICAL**

From the standpoint of this framework these are less rival hypotheses than nodes in a *reinforcing loop*. Cheap energy made invention profitable; invention raised productivity and trade; trade and productivity raised fiscal revenue; revenue financed navies, courts and schools; security and the rule of law reduced the risk of investment, which raised trade again (Figure 6a). Each condition raises the effectiveness of the others, which is why single-cause explanations struggle and why the loop, once started, accelerated.




Figure 6. Feedback anatomy: growth and strain. (a) The reinforcing growth loop that powered the European ascent. (b) The mirror-image reinforcing loop that can operate when obligations rise and growth slows (Section 8).

Source: H Heuristics causal-loop diagrams.

5.2 The size of the effect

The Maddison Project Database, which reconstructs historical GDP, gives a sense of the scale. On its panel of countries, Western Europe produced about a third of measured world output by 1870, and—once the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are added as ‘Western offshoots’—the West accounted for something in the order of 55–58% of world GDP in 1913, from roughly a fifth of world population (Figure 7 in Section 6; [Bolt & van Zanden 2024](#)). The panel omits the Russian Empire before 1950, which slightly inflates early Western shares, but the magnitude is not in doubt. **EMPIRICAL**

Military and political power rose in step. European states and their offshoots governed or dominated most of the world's land surface by 1914, using the fiscal-military machinery described in Section 4 and industrial products—steamships, rifles, railways, telegraphs—that rapidly extended their range. The global gradient that Europe had learned to exploit in the early modern period became a formal system of empires.

5.3 The nation-state as an integration technology

The nineteenth-century nation-state scaled coordination from the region to the nation. Mass schooling, standard languages, conscript armies, national taxation and statistics bound populations into units able to act together at scale ([Tilly 1990](#)). It was a spectacularly effective emergent structure (Pattern 3) and, because it fused identity with fiscal and military capacity, it was also an engine of mobilization. Nationalism functioned as an integration technology: it supplied the shared narratives that let strangers accept taxation, conscription and common law. We return in Section 7 to the sense in which such narratives are themselves cultural infrastructure that needs reproduction.

5.4 Dominance contains its own instability

Positive feedback does not distinguish between constructive and destructive loops. The competitive dynamics that had driven innovation also produced arms races, tightly coupled alliances and imperial rivalries. By 1914 the European system had the properties that network theory associates with cascading failure: dense, tightly coupled connections with few circuit-breakers ([Buldyrev et al. 2010](#)). **ANALOGY** A local shock—the July Crisis—propagated through alliance commitments and mobilization timetables into a continental war. The two world wars (1914–1945) were Pattern 5's negative face: reinforcing competition without a stabilizing outer layer.

The consequences are visible in the data. Western Europe's share of world GDP fell from about 33% in 1913 to about 25% in 1950; economic and strategic primacy passed to the United States and the Soviet Union; colonial empires dissolved within three decades of 1945. Dominance had peaked, though the peak was still invisible to many who lived through it.

5.5 Post-war re-coupling: the second scaling

Europe's post-1945 recovery rested on a new architecture. American security guarantees through NATO (1949), the Marshall Plan (roughly \$13 billion), a liberal trading order and cheap oil provided external supports; the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the Treaty of Rome (1957), the single market (1993), the euro (1999) and, in 2020, joint EU borrowing under NextGenEU ([European Commission 2020](#)) provided successive layers of supranational coordination. Western Europe held a roughly constant quarter of world output through 1973, and welfare states stabilized domestic politics. In the vocabulary of Pattern 3, integration was a second scaling—a new level of organization above the nation-state, built to prevent a repeat of the first scaling's catastrophe.

SECTION FINDING

Europe's dominance was produced by interlocking positive feedbacks among energy, invention, trade, fiscal capacity and security. Those same loops generated the instability that ended primacy in 1914–1945, after which a post-war architecture re-coupled Europe on new foundations—external security, cheap energy and open markets—whose durability is the central question of the next three sections.

SECTION 6

Saturation: Convergence and the Changing Conditions of Expansion

Saturation begins when the conditions that supported expansion change. In the cycle of Figure 1 it is the phase dominated by Pattern 4—the recurrence and convergence of structures—together with the first appearance of maintenance costs that growth had previously masked. For Europe the evidence points to three overlapping processes: convergence of other regions toward European capabilities, erosion of several supports of the post-war peak, and rising returns-to-complexity problems.

6.1 The great convergence

Figure 7 plots the Maddison Project's reconstruction of regional shares of world output. The West's share rose from roughly a third in 1820 (on a thin panel) to around 58% in 1913, held at about 55% in 1950, and has fallen steadily since: to roughly 44% around 2000, and to about 30% in 2022. Western Europe alone slid from a third of world output in 1913 to 25% in 1950 and 13% in 2022. Over the same period the West's share of world population fell from about 22% to about 10%. East and South/Southeast Asia together, by contrast, rose to about 41% of world output in 2022. World Bank series for the European Union tell the same story: the EU's share of world nominal GDP fell from 29% in 1980 to 17.5% in 2024, its PPP share from 23.5% in 1990 to 14.0%, and its population share from 10.5% in 1970 to 5.5% ([World Bank 2026](#)). **EMPIRICAL**




Figure 7. The great convergence. (a) Regional shares of world GDP (PPP), benchmark years 1820–2022. (b) The West's share of world GDP and population. *The country panel omits Russia and the USSR before 1950, which slightly overstates early Western and understates Eastern European shares.

Source: Maddison Project Database 2023 ([Bolt & van Zanden 2024](#)); H Heuristics calculations.

Two readings of this chart are possible, and they are not equivalent. The pessimistic reading takes the fall in share as a sign of failure. The reading that fits the framework better treats it as the *expected signature of successful diffusion*: capital, technology and institutional models flow down a gradient from leader to follower (Pattern 2), and where followers face similar constraints they converge on similar structures (Pattern 4). The

pre-industrial distribution—Asia holding the larger part of world output—is probably the normal one; the 1913–1950 concentration of output in Europe and its offshoots was the anomaly. In absolute terms Europeans are far richer than they were in 1950. What has changed is the *relative* position, and with it the structural advantages that depended on being the only industrial region.

6.2 The supports of the peak

A structure persists while its sustaining conditions remain viable. Table 4 inventories seven supports of the Western peak and their status in 2026. Several show strain at once, a point that carries more weight than the severity of any single one.

Table 4. Sustaining conditions of the European peak and their status

Condition	Role at the peak	Status in 2026	Evidence
Technological and productivity lead	Industrial and post-war leadership	Productivity growth has lagged the US; no EU company worth over €100 billion has been founded from scratch in 50 years; ideas are getting harder to find globally.	Draghi 2024 ; Bloom et al. 2020
Cheap, secure energy	Coal, then oil, then pipeline gas	Net import dependency 57% in 2024 (62.5% in 2022); Russia's share of EU gas imports fell from 45% (2021) to about 12% (2025) at high adjustment cost.	Eurostat 2026c ; European Commission 2025 ; European Commission 2026
Demographic expansion	Young, growing labour force	TFR 1.34 (2024); natural change negative since 2012; working-age population projected to fall about 10% by 2050.	Eurostat 2026b ; Eurostat 2026a ; Eurostat 2023a
Outsourced security	US guarantee; low defence spending	European NATO members spent \$559 billion in 2025; allies agreed a 5% of GDP target by 2035 (3.5% core + 1.5% related).	SIPRI 2026 ; NATO 2025
Open markets, favourable terms	Global trade; low-cost raw materials	A 2025 framework set a 15% US tariff ceiling on most EU goods; EU law targets no more than 65% of any strategic raw material from one third country by 2030.	Food Manufacturing / AP 2025 ; European Commission 2024
Social compact and legitimacy	Welfare states; trust in institutions	Rising populist vote and party-system fragmentation; V-Dem records autocratization in seven EU members.	Algan et al. 2017 ; V-Dem Institute 2026
Fiscal space	Low debt after 1945; growth	Euro-area debt about 89% of GDP; deficits near 3.3%; Italy, France, Greece, Belgium and Spain above 100%.	Eurostat 2026c ; Euronews 2026

6.3 Diminishing returns to complexity

The third process is internal. [Tainter \(1988\)](#) proposed that societies respond to problems by adding complexity—more specialists, rules, hierarchy, information processing—which is initially a high-return investment. As the easy gains are exhausted, each additional unit of complexity yields less, while the upkeep of what already exists keeps rising. Past a threshold, marginal returns turn negative; a society then faces a choice between ever-costlier maintenance and simplification, and simplification can become the rational response (Figure 8). **MODEL** **EMPIRICAL** for historical cases; **HYPOTHESIS** when applied to Europe today.




Figure 8. Diminishing returns to complexity. (a) Cumulative benefits flatten while upkeep keeps rising. (b) The marginal return falls and eventually turns negative. Stylised after [Tainter 1988](#); not estimated from data.

Source: H Heuristics illustration.

Is there evidence of falling returns to complexity in contemporary Europe? Three indications, all debatable, deserve attention. First, innovation: across the advanced economies, the number of researchers needed to sustain a given rate of productivity growth has risen steeply ([Bloom et al. 2020](#)), and papers and patents appear to be less disruptive than they were ([Park, Leahey & Funk 2023](#)). Second, fiscal capacity: a rising share of budgets is committed to ageing, debt service, and now defence and energy security (Section 8). Third, institutional friction: an IMF gravity-model estimate quoted by Draghi puts trade costs inside the single market at the equivalent of a 44% tariff for manufacturing and up to 110% for services, compared with 15% across US states; the estimate is contested on methodological grounds ([Bocconi IEP 2025](#)), but few dispute the direction that intra-EU trade is well below US interstate levels. **EMPIRICAL** The report of [Letta \(2024\)](#) and the diagnosis of [Draghi \(2024\)](#) converge on the view that the fragmentation of Europe's markets and regulation imposes costs that integration has not yet recovered.

The balance of evidence is that returns have *not* turned negative across the board: the single market, the euro and cross-border research programmes still generate positive returns. But the zone in which additional complexity adds net value has narrowed, and the cost of maintaining the existing structure is rising faster than its measured benefits in several domains. That is a K-phase signature (Section 10).

SECTION FINDING

Saturation is visible in three ways: the West's share of world output has fallen from about 58% to 30% as diffusion and convergence have worked as expected; most of the supports of the post-war peak are weakening together; and returns to additional institutional complexity are falling in important domains. None of these is a collapse indicator by itself; together they define the starting conditions for the dissolution pressures in Sections 7 and 8.

SECTION 7

Dissolution Pressures I: Demography, Ethnic Blending and Cultural Transmission

Sections 7 and 8 examine the pressures that could turn saturation into dissolution. We begin with demography because it is the slowest-moving and most predictable of the stressors—a ‘slow variable’ in the language of resilience science ([Scheffer et al. 2012](#))—and because it is where the empirical evidence is strongest. We then treat ethnic blending and cultural change, where the evidence is more nuanced and where public discussion is most often distorted. Throughout, the goal is to identify mechanisms and test claims against data, not to assign blame to any group.

FOUR CONCEPTS KEPT APART

- **Demographic structure:** fertility, mortality and age composition.
- **Migration:** flows of people across borders, which alter size and composition.
- **Ethnic blending:** mixing of ancestry and descent groups through migration and intermarriage.
- **Cultural transmission:** the social reproduction of language, norms, skills and institutions, which can change independently of ancestry.

7.1 The arithmetic comes first

The EU's total fertility rate fell from about 2.6 births per woman in the early 1960s to 1.34 in 2024, the lowest since Eurostat's series began in 2001 and well below the replacement level of roughly 2.1, which Europe has been below since the mid-1970s (Figure 9a; [Eunews 2026](#); [World Bank 2026](#)). Births fell from a peak of 6.8 million in 1964 to about 3.55 million in 2024. Deaths now exceed births in the EU as a whole: natural change turned negative in 2012 and has widened to roughly –1.35 million a year by 2025 (Figure 9b; [Eurostat 2026a](#)). The EU population nevertheless rose from 451.3 million on 1 January 2025 to about 452.0 million a year later, because net migration (including statistical adjustments) of about 2.1 million exceeded natural decline.

EMPIRICAL

Eurostat's EUROPOP2023 projections translate these flows into the future (Figure 10). In the baseline, the EU population drifts from about 453 million in 2030 to 448 million in 2050 and 420 million in 2100. The working-age population (15–64) falls from 285.5 million in 2022 to 257 million in 2050 and 228 million in 2100, a decline of 10% by mid-century and 20% by 2100. The old-age dependency ratio rises from 33 persons aged 65 or over per 100 of working age in 2022 to 50 in 2050 and 60 in 2100 ([Eurostat 2023a](#); [Eurostat 2023b](#)). Eurostat stresses that projections are ‘what-if’ scenarios; the sensitivity tests bracket the baseline widely. A lower-fertility variant ends near 354 million in 2100. In a *no-migration* counterfactual the population falls to about 295 million, the working-age population to 153 million (–47%), and old-age dependency approaches 70. A higher-migration variant sustains about 470 million. **MODEL**




Figure 9. Europe's demographic arithmetic. (a) EU total fertility rate, 1960–2024 (World Bank series to 2023; Eurostat 2024). (b) Natural change and net migration, EU-27, 1990–2025; the 2022 peak reflects displacement from Ukraine.

Source: World Bank ([World Bank 2026](#)); Eurostat ([Eurostat 2026a](#); [Eurostat 2026b](#)); H Heuristics calculations.




Figure 10. Population scenarios to 2100. EUROPOP2023 projection variants for the EU-27: baseline, higher migration, lower fertility, and a no-migration counterfactual that is not a forecast but a measure of what migration contributes.

Source: Eurostat EUROPOP2023 ([Eurostat 2023a](#); [Eurostat 2023b](#)).

Three implications follow. First, the fiscal and labour-market stress of ageing is large under every scenario: even the high-migration variant leaves old-age dependency near 58 by 2100. Draghi's report notes that the EU workforce is on course to shrink by close to two million people each year by 2040 ([Draghi 2024](#)). Second, migration is a *stabilizer of the arithmetic*—it changes the size of the population, the support ratio and the tax base far more than any plausible change in fertility—but it does not reverse ageing, since migrants also age. Third, population size interacts with innovation: ideas are produced by interacting minds, and the models and evidence on cumulative culture suggest that innovation scales with the size and connectedness of a population ([Kremer 1993](#); [Powell, Shennan & Thomas 2009](#); [Muthukrishna & Henrich 2016](#)). A shrinking, ageing population need not innovate less if it is open and productive, but it must make up the difference through productivity, participation and openness. **HYPOTHESIS**

7.2 Europe has always been blended

Section 3 showed that European ancestry is the product of repeated large-scale admixture of Mesolithic foragers, Neolithic farmers and Bronze Age steppe pastoralists ([Lazaridis et al. 2014](#); [Haak et al. 2015](#)). The pattern continued in the historical period. Imperial Rome was a genetic crossroads ([Antonio et al. 2019](#)). Viking-age Scandinavians were themselves genetically heterogeneous, with ancestry from outside Scandinavia, and 'Viking' identity was not coextensive with Scandinavian descent ([Margaryan et al. 2020](#)). Germanic, Slavic, Magyar, Norman, Moorish, Sephardic, Huguenot and Ottoman movements each left demographic and cultural residues. In the twentieth century forced population transfers after 1945, decolonization migration, post-war labour recruitment, the Yugoslav wars and EU free movement redistributed populations again. **EMPIRICAL**

Today about 10% of EU residents—some 46.7 million—were born outside the EU, and roughly a further 4% were born in a different member state, giving a foreign-born share of about 14% in aggregate ([Sofia Globe 2026](#); [RFBerlin 2025](#)). The aggregate hides large variation: Luxembourg's share exceeds 50%, Malta's and Cyprus's are near 30%, and Germany hosts the largest absolute number at about 18 million. The significance of these facts is not that the present is unprecedented, nor that it is unproblematic. It is that European *continuity* has never meant ancestral stasis. The relevant variable is the *rate* of change relative to the capacity of institutions to integrate it.

7.3 What the evidence says about diversity, cohesion and performance

The empirical literature does not support a simple story in either direction. Table 5 summarizes the main strands.

Table 5. Evidence on diversity, cohesion and performance

Domain	Main finding	Conditions and caveats	Sources
Social trust	In more diverse US neighbourhoods, trust (including in-group trust) was lower in the short run. A meta-analysis finds a small negative average association between diversity and trust, stronger at the neighbourhood level and weaker over wider areas.	Highly heterogeneous across studies; contact and integration moderate effects; cross-sectional designs limit causal claims.	Putnam 2007 ; Dinesen, Schaeffer & Sønderskov 2020 ; van der Meer & Tolsma 2014
Public goods	Ethnic fragmentation is associated with lower provision of productive public goods in US cities and with weaker outcomes in poor, institutionally weak countries.	Effects shrink or reverse where institutions are strong and incomes high.	Alesina, Baqir & Easterly 1999 ; Alesina & La Ferrara 2005
Productivity and innovation	Greater diversity of birthplaces is associated with higher wages and productivity of the native-born in US cities, and with higher income across countries.	Endogeneity concerns; skilled-migrant composition matters; ethnic fractionalization (as opposed to birthplace diversity) shows no such gain.	Ottaviano & Peri 2006 ; Alesina, Harnoss & Rapoport 2016
Fiscal effects	UK immigrants arriving since 2000 contributed more in taxes than they received (EEA about £20 billion, non-EEA about £5 billion, 2001–2011). In the US, first-generation immigrants cost more at early ages, and the second generation are among the strongest net contributors.	Depends on age at arrival, skills, employment and time horizon; results differ by country and welfare design.	Dustmann & Frattini 2014 ; National Academies 2016
Political fragmentation	Regions with larger post-2008 unemployment surges saw larger falls in institutional trust and larger populist gains. Far-right vote shares rise by roughly 30% after financial crises; populist rule is associated with GDP about 10% lower after 15 years.	Economic insecurity and institutional failure are the main drivers in these studies; identity politics interacts with them.	Algan et al. 2017 ; Funke, Schularick & Trebesch 2016 ; Funke, Schularick & Trebesch 2023

Read together, these findings describe a *conditional* relationship. Diversity is associated with modestly lower trust and lower public-goods provision where institutions are weak, inequality is high or segregation is entrenched, and with neutral or positive outcomes for productivity and public finances where institutions are strong, labour-market access is good and integration is supported. The political evidence is notable: the most robust predictor of party-system fragmentation in the studies reviewed is economic and institutional failure, especially after financial crises, rather than the foreign-born share as such. Identity politics amplifies and channels discontent, but the discontent has independent roots. **EMPIRICAL**

7.4 Cultural transmission: what has to be reproduced

Civilizations survive through cultural transmission—the social reproduction of knowledge, norms and institutions—which follows regularities distinct from genetic inheritance ([Boyd & Richerson 1985](#)). Two points are decisive for Europe. First, the cultural infrastructure behind its rise—impersonal trust, literacy, rule-based public administration and the norms of open scientific inquiry—was itself built historically, in part through institutions such as the Western Church ([Schulz et al. 2019](#); [Henrich 2020](#)). It is therefore a *maintained structure*, not a genetic endowment, and it persists only while schools, courts, civic organizations and shared languages keep reproducing it. Second, innovation depends on the size and connectedness of the ‘collective brain’ ([Muthukrishna & Henrich 2016](#)), which means that inflows of people with different skills and ideas can raise as well as strain the stock of cultural capital, depending on how they are integrated.

Dissolution of cultural continuity can therefore occur without any change in ancestry: through falling transmission fidelity (declining civic participation, weakening basic educational attainment, erosion of generalized trust), through political polarization that treats institutions as the property of one faction, or through the loss of shared narratives that legitimate taxation and common obligations. Equally, integration is two-way: Rome’s absorption of provincials, the Frankish–Gallo-Roman synthesis and the Norman fusion with Anglo-Saxon England each produced a *new* cultural settlement rather than the preservation of either input.

This suggests an explicit hypothesis. Let the **absorption ratio** be the capacity of a society’s integrating institutions (housing, language education, labour-market access, schooling, local government, trust-building civic life, fiscal room) divided by the rate of compositional and cultural change. When the ratio is high, blending raises the collective brain and economic dynamism, as in the Roman and Norman cases; when it is low, segregation, resentment and identity mobilization rise, and the cohesion costs in Table 5 materialize.

HYPOTHESIS The Fickian analogy is illustrative only—flux depends on the gradient and on the permeability of the medium—and the hypothesis would be falsified if, controlling for economic conditions, integration-capacity indicators showed no relationship to cohesion outcomes across regions. The Temporary Protection Directive, activated in March 2022 for more than four million people displaced from Ukraine, shows that European institutions can scale absorption rapidly when the policy framework is clear.

SECTION ASSESSMENT

- **Demography:** a strong, slow, well-measured structural driver. Ageing and low fertility will constrain labour supply, public finances and innovation under every plausible scenario. Confidence: high.
- **Ethnic blending:** a constitutive feature of European history, not a cause of its decline. The evidence reviewed does not support treating diversity as an automatic cause of collapse. Confidence: high.
- **Cohesion and cultural transmission:** a conditional risk channel. Its severity depends on the absorption ratio, economic security and the political framing of change. Confidence: moderate.

SECTION 8

Dissolution Pressures II: Institutions, Finance, Security, Resources and the Polycrisis

Demography sets the slow background. The faster-moving pressures arise where Europe's institutional layers meet money, security, energy and climate. This section examines each and then asks how they interact.

8.1 Institutional fragmentation and political decay

The European Union is the clearest example of Pattern 3 in the post-war world: a new level of coordination above the nation-state, assembled from six members in 1951 to twenty-seven in 2020. Like any emergent structure it must now be maintained. Its design carries known strains. Core competences such as foreign policy and taxation require unanimity; the monetary union lacks a full fiscal and banking union; and electoral legitimacy remains primarily national. The euro-area sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2012 showed the consequences—survival required the European Central Bank's 2012 pledge to do 'whatever it takes'—and the United Kingdom's departure on 31 January 2020 demonstrated that exit from the union is not hypothetical. The 2020 agreement on joint borrowing of around €750 billion under NextGenEU ([European Commission 2020](#)) marked a step toward fiscal capacity, but it remains exceptional.

Two long-standing theories predict how mature institutional systems lose adaptability. [Olson \(1982\)](#) argued that stable societies accumulate distributional coalitions—organized interests that capture rents and slow adjustment—so that growth and flexibility decline with institutional age. [Fukuyama \(2014\)](#) describes 'political decay': institutions that fail to adapt to changed circumstances, are captured by entrenched elites or become rigidly proceduralized. Multi-level systems like the EU, with many veto points, may be especially exposed. **HYPOTHESIS** Letta and Draghi both identify decision-making speed and market fragmentation as binding constraints ([Letta 2024](#); [Draghi 2024](#)).

The political environment is also strained. The V-Dem Institute's 2026 report records autocratization affecting seven EU member states and two of Europe's principal allies, the UK and the US, and finds that the level of democracy for the average citizen in Western Europe and North America is at its lowest in over fifty years—a figure driven mainly by the United States ([V-Dem Institute 2026](#); [University of Gothenburg 2026](#)). Populist leaders, the most comprehensive recent study finds, are associated with markedly worse economic outcomes (GDP about 10% lower after fifteen years; [Funke, Schularick & Trebesch 2023](#)), and financial crises reliably raise far-right vote shares ([Funke, Schularick & Trebesch 2016](#)). **EMPIRICAL** Structural-demographic theory offers a broader frame—population growth, elite over-production and falling living standards erode state finances and raise instability ([Turchin 2003](#); [Turchin & Nefedov 2009](#))—but its applicability to contemporary Europe is untested, and the theory's own retrospective assessment is mixed ([Turchin & Korotayev 2020](#)). **HYPOTHESIS**

8.2 Fiscal strain: the second reinforcing loop

The loop in Figure 6b is the fiscal expression of Pattern 5. Rising obligations—ageing, debt service, defence, energy and climate investment—leave less room for the investment that raises growth; slower growth raises the debt ratio and political conflict; and political conflict reduces the ability to agree on reform. Figure 11

shows the starting point. Euro-area gross public debt rose from 66% of GDP in 2007 to 93% in 2014, peaked at 96% in 2020, and stood at about 88% at the end of 2025. Mid-2026 data put it at 88.8–88.9% for the 21-member euro area, with Greece (143.5%), Italy (138.9%), France (117–119%), Belgium (109%) and Spain (102%) above or near 100%, and aggregate deficits of about 3.3% of GDP ([Eurostat 2026c](#); [Eurostat 2026d](#); [Euronews 2026](#)). **EMPIRICAL**




Figure 11. Public debt in the EU and euro area. General government gross debt, % of GDP, 1995–2025. Euro-area series covers the 20 members of 2023–2025; later quarterly data cover 21 with Bulgaria.

Source: Eurostat [gov_10dd_edpt1] ([Eurostat 2026c](#)).

New claims on public budgets are large. NATO allies agreed in June 2025 to reach 5% of GDP on defence and related security by 2035 (3.5% for core defence plus 1.5% for infrastructure and resilience; [NATO 2025](#)). The EU's SAFE instrument offers €150 billion in loans as part of a headline €800 billion 'ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030' effort ([Bird & Bird 2025](#)). Draghi estimates that restoring competitiveness requires additional investment of €750–800 billion a year, 4.4–4.7% of EU GDP ([Draghi 2024](#)). Unlike the post-war reconstruction, these obligations coincide with an ageing population.

Two cautions apply. First, no debt ratio is a magic threshold: the famous claim of a growth cliff at 90% of GDP ([Reinhart & Rogoff 2010](#)) did not survive replication ([Herndon, Ash & Pollin 2014](#)). What matters is the growth–interest differential, credibility and political capacity to adjust. Second, the euro area's institutional design raises the importance of confidence: members cannot devalue, the ECB's backstop instruments are conditional, and a crisis in a large borrower would test the political commitments of the others. The risk is therefore less an arithmetic limit than a *political* failure to agree on financing, consolidation or joint liabilities in time. **ANALOGY** **HYPOTHESIS**

8.3 Security, geopolitics and hub dependence

European security was for decades largely outsourced. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 ended that arrangement's credibility. SIPRI reports that European military spending rose 14% in 2025, that the 29 European NATO members spent \$559 billion, and that Germany's spending rose 24% to \$114 billion (2.3% of GDP), while Russia spent an estimated \$190 billion, or 7.5% of its GDP ([SIPRI 2026](#)). The scale and speed of adjustment are notable. So is the long-run uncertainty about the level of US commitment: the framework agreement of July 2025 capped most US tariffs on EU goods at 15% ([Food Manufacturing / AP](#)

2025), but the broader question is whether the strategic environment of the last seventy years can be assumed.

Network theory (Section 4) suggests asking where Europe's hubs are. The 2022 energy shock was an unplanned experiment in hub removal: Russia supplied 45% of EU gas imports in 2021, and its share had fallen to about 12% by 2025 ([European Commission 2025](#); [European Commission 2026](#)). Europe adapted—a real demonstration of adaptive capacity—but at heavy fiscal, industrial and household cost, and it left a legacy of higher energy prices. Comparable concentrations remain in critical raw materials and their processing, which is why the EU's 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act sets a benchmark of no more than 65% of any strategic material from a single third country by 2030 ([European Commission 2024](#)); in advanced semiconductors, digital platforms and cloud infrastructure; and in the external security guarantee. **ANALOGY**

8.4 Resources and climate

Europe imports 57% of its energy (2024; 62.5% in 2022), with oil and petroleum products making up two-thirds of imports and natural gas about a quarter ([Eurostat 2026e](#)). Climate adds a slower and larger pressure. The Copernicus–WMO *European State of the Climate* reports that Europe is the fastest-warming continent, warming at about twice the global rate since the 1980s; in 2024 it was about 2.9 °C above pre-industrial levels against 1.55 °C globally ([Copernicus & WMO 2025](#)). The European Environment Agency's first European Climate Risk Assessment identifies 36 major climate risks to ecosystems, food, health, infrastructure and finance ([EEA 2024](#)). At the planetary scale six of nine boundaries have been transgressed ([Richardson et al. 2023](#)), the framework introduced by [Rockström et al. \(2009\)](#).

Climate and resource pressure matter for dissolution less as an isolated driver than as a *threat multiplier*. The historical record associates climatic shocks with stress on complex societies: the Late Antique Little Ice Age beginning in 536 CE coincided with plague and political fragmentation in the Mediterranean ([Büntgen et al. 2016](#); [Harper 2017](#)), and long-term European climate variability has repeatedly aligned with periods of social upheaval ([Büntgen et al. 2011](#)). **EMPIRICAL** Section 9 returns to these cases.

8.5 Polycrisis: coupling is the vulnerability

The concept of a *polycrisis*, popularized by [Tooze \(2022\)](#), is made precise by the Cascade Institute's work: a global polycrisis occurs when crises in multiple systems become causally entangled in ways that degrade humanity's prospects more than the sum of the separate crises ([Lawrence et al. 2024](#); [Cascade Institute 2026](#)). The empirical foundation is the idea of *synchronous failure*—slow-moving stresses accumulate in coupled systems and fast-moving triggers then set off cascades ([Homer-Dixon et al. 2015](#); [Helbing 2013](#)).

MODEL ANALOGY In network terms, interdependence raises efficiency in normal times and the probability of system-wide failure under stress ([Buldyrev et al. 2010](#); [Haldane & May 2011](#)).

Table 6 lists the seven stress channels examined in Sections 6–8 and their principal couplings. The key point is the pattern of cross-links: ageing raises fiscal pressure; fiscal pressure constrains defence and energy investment; energy and security shocks raise inflation and cut growth; slower growth feeds populism and political fragmentation; fragmentation slows reform. The system's vulnerability is not that any single channel is at breaking point, but that all are elevated at once and several reinforce one another. That is the signature of Figure 6b.

Table 6. Stress channels, latest readings and couplings

Channel	Latest reading	Stress†	Principal couplings	Source
Demography	TFR 1.34 (2024); natural change –1.35 million (2025); old-age dependency 33 → 50 by 2050	High	Fiscal; labour supply; innovation; politics	Eurostat 2026a ; Eurostat 2023b
Public finance	Euro-area debt about 89% of GDP; deficit about 3.3%; five states above 100%	Elevated	Defence; ageing; interest; political conflict	Eurostat 2026d ; Euronews 2026
Energy and materials	57% import dependency; Russian gas 45% → 12%; raw-material concentration	Elevated	Industry; inflation; security; climate	Eurostat 2026e ; European Commission 2024
Security	European NATO spending \$559 billion; 5% target by 2035; war in Ukraine	High	Fiscal; energy; politics	SIPRI 2026 ; NATO 2025
Institutions and politics	Autocratization in seven EU members; populist gains; unanimity constraints	Elevated	Reform speed; fiscal; cohesion	V-Dem Institute 2026 ; Funke, Schularick & Trebesch 2023
Productivity	Persistent gap with the US; no new €100 billion firm in 50 years	Elevated	Fiscal; demography; geopolitics	Draghi 2024 ; Bloom et al. 2020
Climate and ecology	Europe warming about twice the global rate; 36 major risks identified	Rising	Agriculture; health; insurance; migration	Copernicus & WMO 2025 ; EEA 2024

Source: H Heuristics synthesis. †Stress is an H Heuristics qualitative judgement (Moderate / Elevated / High / Rising), not a statistical index.

SECTION ASSESSMENT

Evidence of strain is strong in every channel, but evidence of *breakdown* is absent: Europe has repeatedly absorbed shocks (2010–12, 2020, 2022) and adapted, albeit slowly and expensively. The principal risk is correlated, not individual: a period in which several stresses peak together, politically and fiscally, while adaptive capacity is stretched. We treat that as the pathway to partial dissolution that Section 10 examines.

SECTION 9

Lessons from Earlier Dissolutions

A framework that claims recurring patterns of dissolution should be tested against cases. The sample is small and heterogeneous, definitions of 'collapse' differ ([Middleton 2017](#); [Butzer 2012](#); [Cumming & Peterson 2017](#)), and no historical case is a template for the present. What the cases can do is discipline the question: which mechanisms recur, how fast they act, and what survives. Table 7 summarizes six.

Table 7. Comparative dissolutions and what they suggest for Europe

Case	What dissolved	Principal mechanisms	Role of population movement	Lesson
Late Bronze Age Eastern Mediterranean (c. 1200–1150 BCE)	Palace economies and the long-distance tin and copper trade network of several states	Interdependent trade network hit by drought, earthquakes, famine, raiding and internal revolt in close succession (Cline 2014)	Both a consequence and a cause: displaced groups added pressure to failing states	Tight coupling plus multiple shocks produced cascade; reorganization at lower scale took centuries
Western Roman Empire (third to fifth centuries CE)	The western imperial state and its fiscal-military system	Civil wars, fiscal strain, plague and climatic cooling, loss of provincial revenue, external pressure (Harper 2017 ; Heather 2005 ; Büntgen et al. 2016)	Settlement of Germanic groups interacted with weak finances; scholars disagree on weight (Ward-Perkins 2005 ; Wickham 2005)	Absorption failed when the fiscal-military core failed—Rome had absorbed newcomers for centuries
Habsburg Spain (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries)	Great-power rank; fiscal solvency	Imperial overstretch, repeated sovereign defaults between 1557 and 1647, dependence on American silver (Kennedy 1987)	Coercive homogenization (the expulsion of the Moriscos, 1609–1614) was a policy response, not a solution	Relative decline without collapse is the commonest trajectory; rivals with better institutions overtake
Classic Maya southern lowlands (c. 800–900 CE)	Dynastic city-states in the southern lowlands	Drought, inter-state warfare, population pressure; regionally varied and multi-causal (Butzer 2012 ; Diamond 2005)	Population shifted to other regions rather than disappearing	Collapse can be regional and partial; for many people the system reorganized
Soviet Union (1991)	The union's political and economic architecture	Stagnation, fiscal and energy-price shock, legitimacy loss, elite defection, nationalist mobilization	Ethnic-national mobilization became the vehicle once central legitimacy and finances failed	A political layer can dissolve in months while people and infrastructure persist
Europe 1914–1950	Continental order, colonial empires, financial system	Tightly coupled alliances, total war, depression, genocide and displacement	Mass expulsions and displacement (some twelve to fourteen million Germans after 1945)	Reorganization within a decade was possible with external support and new institutions

9.1 What recurs

- **Single-cause stories rarely survive.** Complex societies fail when several stresses coincide with rigid structure ([Butzer 2012](#); [Cumming & Peterson 2017](#)). The Bronze Age case is the cleanest example of a multiple-shock cascade in an interdependent network ([Buldyrev et al. 2010](#)).
- **Fiscal-military capacity and legitimacy are the usual hinge.** Rome, Spain and the Soviet Union each lost the ability to pay for the structure they had built, and each was then exposed to challenges that earlier would have been absorbed. This is the empirical core of [Tainter \(1988\)](#)'s argument.
- **Slow variables set the stage; fast variables trigger.** Climate, pathogens, demography and soils shift slowly; wars, defaults and elections act quickly ([Scheffer et al. 2009](#); [Harper 2017](#)).

- **Movement of people is typically an interaction term, not an independent cause.** It matters when state capacity to absorb or repel is failing (Rome, the Late Bronze Age) and when elites mobilize identity against a weakening centre (the Soviet Union). Where the fiscal and administrative core held, as in the long centuries of Roman expansion, large-scale incorporation was a source of strength.
- **What survives is substantial.** Languages, religions, knowledge, buildings and many institutions persist; the scale of coordination falls, and the pieces are recombined. Recovery times range from a decade (post-1945 Europe) to centuries (post-Bronze Age).
- **Speed varies enormously.** Soviet dissolution took months; Western Rome's unwinding took generations; Spain's relative decline took centuries and never involved collapse.

9.2 What is different now

Several features argue for comfort. Knowledge is stored and replicated at near-zero cost, which makes permanent loss of technique far less likely than after Rome. Medicine, public health and nuclear deterrence change the risks of pandemics and great-power war. European states possess deep administrative capacity, and the EU, ECB and NATO have accumulated experience of crisis management. Several features argue for concern. Global coupling is tighter than ever, so cascades can span continents; billions depend on just-in-time supply chains in energy, food and finance; nuclear arsenals raise the stakes of geopolitical breakdown; and, unlike in 1948, no external power has the means and inclination to underwrite a European reconstruction.

HYPOTHESIS

SECTION FINDING

The historical record does not support the idea that diversity or migration, as such, brings down complex societies. It does support the view that fiscal-military overstretch, loss of legitimacy and coupled shocks do—and that population movements become dangerous when they coincide with state weakness. Dissolution is far more often partial and slow than total and sudden, and reorganization is the norm.

SECTION 10

Reorganization: Scenarios, Signposts and Falsification

If Europe is in a post-peak phase, the decisive question is what comes next. The final pattern in the cycle says that dissolution is rarely an end state: components survive and recombine under new constraints. This section places Europe on the adaptive cycle, describes how early-warning logic would apply, sets out four scenarios, and states what evidence would count against the report's own claims.

10.1 Where is Europe on the cycle?

[Holling \(1973\)](#)'s concept of resilience and the later panarchy framework ([Gunderson & Holling 2002](#)) describe systems as moving through four phases: rapid *exploitation* (r), slow *conservation* (K), abrupt *release* (Ω), and *reorganization* (α). In the conservation phase connectedness and accumulated capital are high, but so is rigidity; the system is efficient and increasingly vulnerable to disturbance. Release follows when a shock overwhelms the system's ability to adapt; reorganization draws on what remains. Adaptive cycles are *nested* across scales: faster, smaller cycles (an institutional layer, a policy regime) operate inside slower, larger ones (a nation, a civilization), and crises can travel between levels.




Figure 12. The adaptive cycle and the H Heuristics placement of the contemporary West. Axes follow Holling's convention. The placement of the West in late-K or early- Ω is a hypothesis, not a measurement.

Source: After [Holling 1973](#) and [Gunderson & Holling 2002](#); H Heuristics synthesis.

H Heuristics' hypothesis is that the post-war Western system, and the EU layer within it, is in late conservation or early release. The evidence is the one catalogued in Sections 6–8: high connectedness (integrated markets, dense supply chains, treaty networks), high accumulated capital (financial, human, infrastructural), rigid decision structures, several simultaneously weakening supports, and rising maintenance costs. **HYPOTHESIS** The nesting matters for interpretation. The *civilizational substrate*—languages, law, science, cities, literacy—changes over centuries. National states operate over decades to centuries. Supranational layers such as the EU, the euro and NATO operate over years to decades and are the

youngest and most exposed. Dissolution pressure falls first on the fastest layers, so the failure of one layer would be consistent with the continuity of the substrate, as it was when the Soviet political architecture dissolved while Russian society persisted.

10.2 Early-warning logic and its limits

As a system approaches a tipping point, its recovery from small shocks slows, so its fluctuations grow and become more persistent—‘critical slowing down’ (Scheffer et al. 2009). Figure 13 shows the pattern in a simple simulated system whose stabilizing feedback is weakened gradually: rising lag-1 autocorrelation and rising variance precede the transition. **MODEL** Applied to societies, the logic suggests monitoring indicators such as the time taken to recover from fiscal or political shocks, volatility in political outcomes, the clustering of crises across domains, and the correlation of stress across national bond markets. **HYPOTHESIS**




Figure 13. Critical slowing down in a simulated system. As stabilizing feedback weakens (left to right), autocorrelation and variance rise. The system is a first-order autoregressive process with persistence rising from 0.30 to 0.985; rolling window 250 steps.

Source: H Heuristics simulation after [Scheffer et al. 2009](#) (Appendix A).

These signals are not forecasts. Their reliability is demonstrated in some ecological and climate systems; in social systems time series are short, policy intervenes endogenously, and false positives are common (Scheffer et al. 2012). The indicators belong in a monitoring dashboard, interpreted alongside the structural evidence, not in a prediction machine.

10.3 Four scenarios

Combine two uncertain variables—the *intensity of systemic stress* and the *adaptive capacity* of institutions—and four configurations result (Figure 14). They are archetypes, not predictions; real trajectories may pass through more than one.




Figure 14. Four scenarios for Europe and the West. Scenarios arise from the interaction of systemic stress and adaptive capacity.

Source: H Heuristics scenario framework.

Table 8. Scenario narratives, signposts and H Heuristics assessment

Scenario	What happens	Signposts	Assessment†
A. Renewal	Capital-markets union and energy transition raise productivity and cut dependency; defence-industrial scale-up is financed; integration of newcomers succeeds; fertility stabilizes near 1.5–1.6.	EU–US productivity gap narrows; import dependency falls toward 50%; new frontier firms emerge; trust indicators stable despite rising foreign-born share.	Possible but demanding; requires sustained political agreement. Not the default.
B. Sclerotic persistence	No decisive shock, but adaptation stays slow; growth about 1%; debt and ageing costs squeeze investment; the West's share of world output continues to fall.	Rising interest and pension outlays as share of budget; slow decision-making; continued populist pressure without regime change.	Most likely baseline over the next decade.
C. Reorganization by design	Shocks force a restructuring—a deeper core with joint defence, energy and fiscal capacity, and a looser periphery—or a re-sorting of alliances and trading blocs.	Majority voting in new domains; permanent joint borrowing; multi-speed treaties; new security architecture.	Plausible; more likely to be triggered by a crisis than adopted in calm.
D. Disorderly dissolution	Correlated shocks (sovereign-debt stress, security crisis, political capture) outrun institutions: exits, capital flight, closed borders, coercive politics, loss of the single market or the euro.	Spread blow-outs; failed joint decisions in crisis; rule-of-law conflicts; breakdown of cross-border payment and energy arrangements.	Low probability, high impact tail; rises if adaptive capacity falls.

Source: H Heuristics synthesis. †Assessment is a qualitative judgement at the date of publication, not a statistical probability.

10.4 Signposts and falsification

A report that cannot be wrong is not research. Table 9 lists the report's principal claims, the evidence that would support each, and the evidence that would count against it.

Table 9. Principal claims and what would falsify them

Claim	Supported if...	Falsified if...	Horizon
Demographic stress is the dominant slow driver	TFR stays at or below 1.4; participation gains do not offset a shrinking workforce	TFR recovers to 1.7+ or productivity growth sustainably offsets labour decline	2026–2040
A reinforcing fiscal-strain loop (R2) is operating	Debt service and ageing costs crowd out investment; spreads widen on shocks	Debt ratios fall while defence and investment rise, with growth above interest rates	2026–2032
Diversity effects depend on the absorption ratio	Regions with weaker integration capacity show lower trust and weaker outcomes after controlling for income	No relationship between integration capacity and cohesion once economic conditions are held fixed	Ongoing
Hub dependence is a major fragility	New supply shocks cause outsized, system-wide disruption	Diversification meets Critical Raw Materials Act benchmarks by 2030 without crisis	2026–2030
Institutional sclerosis limits adaptation	Unanimity blocks key decisions during crises	Majority rules extend; major joint decisions are made fast	2026–2030
Relative decline reflects diffusion, not absolute failure	Real income per head keeps rising while shares fall	Absolute real incomes stagnate or fall for a decade	2026–2036
Late-K / early-Ω placement	Rising variance and persistence in macro-political indicators; clustering of crises	Indicators stable or falling while stresses ease	2026–2035

10.5 Design principles from the architecture

The framework implies a set of design principles for any structure that wishes to remain in the cycle's productive phases. These are analytical implications, not policy prescriptions.

- **Preserve negative feedback.** Fiscal rules that are credible and flexible, automatic stabilizers and strong lender-of-last-resort mechanisms keep reinforcing loops from running away (Pattern 5).
- **Diversify hubs and add redundancy.** Energy interconnectors, multiple suppliers of critical materials and parallel payment systems reduce the damage from the loss of any one node ([Albert, Jeong & Barabási 2000](#)).
- **Preserve polycentric competition inside a shared substrate.** Europe's distinctive strength was selection among many centres combined with common cultural infrastructure. Centralization should be confined to domains where scale is decisive—defence, energy, capital markets—while competition and experimentation are preserved elsewhere ([Scheidel 2019](#)).
- **Invest in integration capacity.** Language, housing, schooling and labour-market access raise the absorption ratio and convert inflows from a stress into a source of the 'collective brain' (Section 7).
- **Renew the innovation reset.** Superlinear systems survive only if resets keep arriving ([Bettencourt et al. 2007](#)); scale-up finance, research and openness to talent are the mechanism.
- **Maintain cultural infrastructure and watch the slow variables.** Education, civic institutions and shared language reproduce trust and the rule of law ([Henrich 2020](#)); demography, climate and debt move slowly and warn early, while politics moves fast and warns late.

SECTION 11

Conclusion: The Architecture Reconsidered

The report began with a symmetrical question: can the architecture that enables a civilization to emerge, expand and dominate also explain how it loses coherence and reorganizes? The evidence supports a qualified yes. Table 10 summarizes the mirror-image structure of the argument.

Table 10. Each creation pattern has a dissolution mode

Pattern	How it built Europe	How it can operate in dissolution
1. Emergence from constraints	Permissive, partitioned geography and agrarian-to-fossil energy bases enabled polycentric growth.	Constraints are shifting: energy dependence, climate, demography, resource concentration.
2. Flows and diffusion	Ideas, technologies and institutions diffused through networks; competition selected the best.	Diffusion levels the leader's advantage; the same channels transmit shocks.
3. Emergence and scaling	From villages to states to a supranational union; scale raised innovation.	Maintenance costs of complexity rise; additional layers yield falling returns.
4. Recurring patterns and convergence	Bureaucracy, cities, taxation and commerce took similar forms across Europe.	Other regions converge on, and in places surpass, European capabilities.
5. Reinforcement, feedback and instability	Trade, state capacity, science and energy reinforced one another.	Rising obligations and slow growth reinforce strain; coupled shocks propagate.
6. Entropy, maintenance and dissolution	Institutions and shared culture were continuously reproduced.	Reproduction falters if trust, finance and coordination are not maintained.

11.1 What the evidence supports

- Europe's rise was produced by a *configuration*—partitioned geography, repeated blending, polycentric competition, dense networks, reinforcing loops—and not by any single factor or inherent endowment.
- The supports of the peak are weakening together. Convergence is largely the expected result of diffusion; the risks lie in demography, fiscal strain, security, energy and institutional adaptation, and above all in their coupling.
- Ethnic blending and cultural change are constitutive of Europe. They are not an automatic cause of collapse; they are one of several channels through which the *absorption ratio*—integration capacity relative to the pace of change—conditions cohesion.
- Collapse in the strict sense is not indicated by current data. The modal path is relative decline with institutional strain; the tail risk is partial, cascading dissolution of the fiscal and political layers, not of the civilizational substrate.

11.2 What it does not

The evidence does not support deterministic claims in any direction: not that decline is certain, not that Europe will remain as it is, and not that any population or culture is a *cause* of dissolution. Physical laws constrain; they do not narrate. The continuity of a civilization lies in continuous reproduction of its conditions, which is an activity, not a state.

11.3 The architecture, reconsidered

Civilizations are not permanent structures. They are continuously reproduced configurations of matter, energy, information, institutions, and human relationships.

'Post-peak' names a phase in a cycle, not an end. What Europe becomes depends on whether it can maintain the conditions its architecture requires, or redesign them at a scale and speed the cycle will not wait for. The framework offers a way to ask the right questions of any structure: what constraints made it possible, what flows and feedbacks scaled it, what conditions sustain it, and what is left when they change?

NEXT STEPS FOR THE H H E U R I S T I C S PROGRAMME

- Publish the *Architecture of Collapse* companion, formalizing the dissolution and reorganization phases across civilizations.
- Build a public monitoring dashboard from the indicators in Tables 6 and 9, updated quarterly.
- Extend the case-study method to other civilizational systems (East Asia, the Islamic world, the Americas) to test which patterns are general.

APPENDIX A

Methods, Data and Limitations

A.1 Data sources and processing

- **Maddison Project Database 2023** ([Bolt & van Zanden 2024](#); [data from the University of Groningen](#)). Regional shares of world GDP (2011 international dollars, PPP) and population were computed for benchmark years (1820, 1870, 1913, 1950, and decades from 1960 to 2020, plus 2022) by summing country values by MPD region; where a country lacked a value in a benchmark year, the nearest observation within three years was used. The country panel omits Russia and the USSR before 1950 and has thin coverage in 1820, which understates 'Eastern Europe' and overstates Western shares in early benchmark years; early values should be read as indicative. Regions: 'Western Europe'; 'Western offshoots' (US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand); 'Eastern Europe' including successor states of the USSR; East Asia; South and Southeast Asia; and a residual group.
- **World Bank World Development Indicators** ([World Bank 2026](#)). EU and world aggregates for nominal GDP (current US\$), GDP in constant PPP dollars, population and total fertility rate, retrieved October 2026 via the World Bank API; shares computed as EU ÷ World.
- **Eurostat** ([Eurostat 2026a](#); [Eurostat 2026b](#); [Eurostat 2026c](#); [Eurostat 2023a](#); [Eurostat 2023b](#)). EU-27 (from 2020) series for population change, fertility, general-government gross debt, and EUROPOP2023 projections (baseline and sensitivity variants), retrieved October 2026 via the Eurostat dissemination API. Recent values are provisional. Debt series use the 20-country euro area through 2025; mid-2026 quarterly figures refer to the 21-country area after Bulgaria's accession.
- **Secondary and official reports** cited for 2024–2026 figures (fertility, foreign-born shares, defence spending, energy dependence, climate, democracy indices) are linked in the text; where only press coverage of an official release was accessible, the source is identified as such.

A.2 Simulations

- **Figure 2a:** analytic solution of the one-dimensional diffusion equation for a step source, $C = \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{erfc}(x / 2\sqrt{Dt})$, with $D = 1$.
- **Figure 2b:** explicit finite-difference solution of the Fisher–KPP equation $\partial u / \partial t = D \partial^2 u / \partial x^2 + r u(1 - u)$, with $r = 0.04$, $D = 0.6$, domain length 120, 600 grid points and reflecting boundaries; initial condition $u = 1$ for $x < 4$.
- **Figure 5:** (a) a Barabási–Albert graph with 140 nodes and two links per new node, for display; (b) giant-component size under random and degree-ranked node removal on three Barabási–Albert graphs of 1,500 nodes, averaged.
- **Figure 13:** first-order autoregressive process $x(t+1) = \lambda(t) x(t) + \varepsilon(t)$, with λ rising linearly from 0.30 to 0.985 over 1,500 steps and noise standard deviation 0.35; rolling lag-1 autocorrelation and variance over a 250-step window.
- **Figures 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12 and 14** are stylised illustrations and diagrams; they are not estimated from data.

A.3 Limitations

- **Sample and inference.** The set of comparable civilizational cases is small; Europe is not a closed system; most causal claims about institutions and culture rest on observational evidence.
- **Measurement.** The quantities that matter most for resilience—institutional capacity, trust, legitimacy—are hard to measure. Survey-based trust indicators and expert-coded democracy indices carry known biases.
- **Contested estimates.** The IMF gravity-model estimate of internal trade costs is disputed ([Bocconi IEP 2025](#)). Early GDP shares from the Maddison database are uncertain. Population projections are scenarios, not forecasts.
- **Judgement.** Stress ratings and scenario assessments (Tables 6 and 8) are H Heuristics' qualitative judgements at the date of publication. They are intended to be falsified by the signposts in Table 9.

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