The twenty-first century is usually described through its headline transitions: the rise of Asia, the ageing of Europe and East Asia, the energy transition, the arrival of artificial intelligence. Beneath these runs a quieter shift that will shape the daily life of more people than any of them. The human population is relocating, by birth rather than migration, into the regions of the planet that climate change is making least habitable. This is the second report in the Century Recalibration series, taking one thread from the first and following it to its conclusion: the collision between where humanity is growing and where the planet is becoming least habitable.
In 1950, one person in five lived in Europe and fewer than one in fourteen in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2100, under UN medium-variant projections, Sub-Saharan Africa will be home to 3.35 billion people, one-third of humanity, and South Asia to a further 2.41 billion — together 57 per cent of the world’s population. Between 2024 and 2100 Sub-Saharan Africa alone is projected to add 2.1 billion people, more than the world’s entire net growth, because East Asia and Europe will together shrink by over a billion. These are also the regions where heat and humidity already approach the limits of human tolerance, where air quality is among the worst on Earth, and where people have the fewest protections: the least electricity, the fewest air conditioners, the most outdoor and informal work, and the weakest health systems.
Combining UN population projections with population-weighted CMIP6 climate projections for every country produces four core findings. Humanity’s home climate is warming faster than the planet: the population-weighted mean annual temperature of the place the average person lives was about 17.3 °C in 1950, is 20.6 °C today, and reaches 23.7 °C by 2100 under SSP2-4.5 and 24.6 °C under SSP3-7.0 — while demographic change alone, holding climate at 1991–2020 conditions, would raise it to 21.4 °C. The world’s people are moving into the heat faster than the heat is moving to them, and both processes are under way at once. Climate change drives most of the rise in per-person heat exposure; demography decides who is exposed and how many.
The phrase “survivability risk” needs care. The popular 35 °C wet-bulb threshold is likely to be crossed only rarely and locally this century; laboratory research puts real-world tolerance limits far lower, near 31 °C wet-bulb for young healthy adults and lower still for older people, children and anyone working. The crisis described here is therefore not mainly about sudden mass death but a chronic, compounding loss of liveability: lost sleep, lost work, lost schooling, lost harvests, more illness, and a steady rise in the number of days on which ordinary life becomes dangerous for those without cooling. And it is long-lived: roughly a quarter of any CO₂ emission is still present after a thousand years, so whatever warming the world reaches at net-zero is approximately what the descendants of today’s African and South Asian children will live with for many generations.
The trajectory is not fixed. The difference between SSP1-2.6 and SSP3-7.0 is the difference between 1.3 billion and 3.6 billion people facing a month or more of dangerous heat each year. The report sets out an agenda built on six commitments, among them holding warming as low as possible — every tenth of a degree avoided spares roughly 140 million people from unprecedented heat — making cooling a basic public good, and treating clean air as climate adaptation. Because the crisis is foreseeable, it is also addressable.